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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: src/content/breakdowns/CVE-2025-60709.md
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ A vulnerability in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver allows out-o
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From the patch diffing results, it was found that the ClfsGetFirstRecord() function has significant changes, whereas the other functions have only minor changes.
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The vulnerable function is `ClfsGetFirstRecord()`, and as the name suggests, it retrieves the first record of a CLFS log block. Here, `a1` points to a `CLFS_LOG_BLOCK_HEADER` structure, and `a2` is the buffer size.
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@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ The vulnerable function is `ClfsGetFirstRecord()`, and as the name suggests, it
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-**Line 12** – This is where the actual issue appears. Instead of properly checking that the offset stays within the buffer, the function only fails when `RecordOffsets[0] > buffer_size + 40`.
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- As a result, the function incorrectly accepts offsets in the range **from `buffer_size` (a2) up to `buffer_size + 0x28` (40 bytes)**. Any value in this range produces an out‑of‑bounds pointer, leading to an out‑of‑bounds read.
In order to exploit this vulnerability, the Base Log File must set `RecordOffsets[0]` to an offset that is larger than the buffer size but not larger than `buffer_size + 0x28`. To reach this vulnerable function, the shortest path is via `CClfsLogFcbPhysical::AppendRegion()` function.
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## Patch Analysis
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In the patched version, the function first loads `RecordOffsets[0]` into `v4`. It then computes `v5 = v4 + 40` (i.e., `RecordOffsets[0] + 0x28`). In the new bounds check (line 17), it ensures that `RecordOffsets[0] + 40` does not exceed the `buffer size (a2/v2 + 40)`. This patch fixes the original bug by ensuring that `RecordOffsets[0] + 0x28` must not exceed the buffer size, preventing the out‑of‑bounds read.
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