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| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +title: "CVE-2025-60709 - Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability" |
| 3 | +pubDate: 2025-12-05 |
| 4 | +author: "Ghostbyt3" |
| 5 | +tags: ["1day", "clfs.sys", "windows", "kernel"] |
| 6 | +description: "A vulnerability in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver allows out-of-bounds memory reads due to insufficient bounds checking in ClfsGetFirstRecord(). The function validates that attacker-controlled record offsets don't exceed `buffer_size + 40` instead of `buffer_size`, enabling reads of up to 40 bytes beyond allocated buffers, potentially leaking sensitive kernel memory for information disclosure or exploit chain development." |
| 7 | +--- |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +A vulnerability in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver allows out-of-bounds memory reads due to insufficient bounds checking in `ClfsGetFirstRecord()`. The function validates that attacker-controlled record offsets don't exceed `buffer_size + 40` instead of `buffer_size`, enabling reads of up to 40 bytes beyond allocated buffers, potentially leaking sensitive kernel memory for information disclosure or exploit chain development. |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +**CVE-2025-60709:** https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-60709 |
| 12 | +**Vulnerability Type:** Out-of-bounds Read |
| 13 | +**Driver Version:** clfs.sys - 10.0.26100.7019 |
| 14 | + |
| 15 | +## Vulnerability analysis |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +From the patch diffing results, it was found that the ClfsGetFirstRecord() function has significant changes, whereas the other functions have only minor changes. |
| 18 | + |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | + |
| 21 | +The vulnerable function is `ClfsGetFirstRecord()`, and as the name suggests, it retrieves the first record of a CLFS log block. Here, `a1` points to a `CLFS_LOG_BLOCK_HEADER` structure, and `a2` is the buffer size. |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | +- **Line 8** – It loads the value at `a1 + 0x28`, which corresponds to the first entry of the `RecordOffsets` array, into `v2`. Therefore, `v2 = RecordOffsets[0]` and represents the offset of the first record. |
| 24 | +- **Line 11** – It obtains the pointer to the first record by computing `a1 + v2` (`a1[v2]`). This value is stored in `result`, which the function will return. |
| 25 | +- The problem lies in the bounds validation. |
| 26 | +- **Line 9** – It checks that the first offset (`RecordOffsets[0]`) does not exceed `0xFFFFFFD8`, which is just a large sanity limit. |
| 27 | +- **Line 12** – This is where the actual issue appears. Instead of properly checking that the offset stays within the buffer, the function only fails when `RecordOffsets[0] > buffer_size + 40`. |
| 28 | +- As a result, the function incorrectly accepts offsets in the range **from `buffer_size` (a2) up to `buffer_size + 0x28` (40 bytes)**. Any value in this range produces an out‑of‑bounds pointer, leading to an out‑of‑bounds read. |
| 29 | + |
| 30 | + |
| 31 | + |
| 32 | +```c++ |
| 33 | +typedef struct _CLFS_LOG_BLOCK_HEADER |
| 34 | +{ |
| 35 | + UCHAR MajorVersion; |
| 36 | + UCHAR MinorVersion; |
| 37 | + UCHAR Usn; |
| 38 | + CLFS_CLIENT_ID ClientId; |
| 39 | + USHORT TotalSectorCount; |
| 40 | + USHORT ValidSectorCount; |
| 41 | + ULONG Padding; |
| 42 | + ULONG Checksum; |
| 43 | + ULONG Flags; |
| 44 | + CLFS_LSN CurrentLsn; |
| 45 | + CLFS_LSN NextLsn; |
| 46 | + ULONG RecordOffsets[16]; |
| 47 | + ULONG SignaturesOffset; |
| 48 | +} CLFS_LOG_BLOCK_HEADER, *PCLFS_LOG_BLOCK_HEADER; |
| 49 | +``` |
| 50 | + |
| 51 | +In order to exploit this vulnerability, the Base Log File must set `RecordOffsets[0]` to an offset that is larger than the buffer size but not larger than `buffer_size + 0x28`. To reach this vulnerable function, the shortest path is via `CClfsLogFcbPhysical::AppendRegion()` function. |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | + |
| 54 | + |
| 55 | +## Patch Analysis |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | +In the patched version, the function first loads `RecordOffsets[0]` into `v4`. It then computes `v5 = v4 + 40` (i.e., `RecordOffsets[0] + 0x28`). In the new bounds check (line 17), it ensures that `RecordOffsets[0] + 40` does not exceed the `buffer size (a2/v2 + 40)`. This patch fixes the original bug by ensuring that `RecordOffsets[0] + 0x28` must not exceed the buffer size, preventing the out‑of‑bounds read. |
| 58 | + |
| 59 | + |
| 60 | + |
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