From e28c0e432ec52dccfdea46c9335b6d4d3c972367 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Maple Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:32:56 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 1/9] ext4: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for ext4_check_flag_values jira VULN-155618 cve CVE-2022-50403 commit-author Gaosheng Cui commit 3bf678a0f9c017c9ba7c581541dbc8453452a7ae Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/ext4/ext4.h:591:2 left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int' Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5 dump_stack+0x15/0x1b ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c ext4_init_fs+0x5a/0x277 do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430 kernel_init_freeable+0x3b3/0x422 kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fixes: 9a4c80194713 ("ext4: ensure Inode flags consistency are checked at build time") Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221031055833.3966222-1-cuigaosheng1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org (cherry picked from commit 3bf678a0f9c017c9ba7c581541dbc8453452a7ae) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index b9572b248929a..21ada4cfcf7d3 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ enum { * * It's not paranoia if the Murphy's Law really *is* out to get you. :-) */ -#define TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG) (EXT4_##FLAG##_FL == (1 << EXT4_INODE_##FLAG)) +#define TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG) (EXT4_##FLAG##_FL == (1U << EXT4_INODE_##FLAG)) #define CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG) BUILD_BUG_ON(!TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG)) static inline void ext4_check_flag_values(void) From de2c511b340249bbba5b9cd39d498b98dbf999fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Maple Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:33:09 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 2/9] wifi: ath9k: don't allow to overwrite ENDPOINT0 attributes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit jira VULN-154355 cve CVE-2023-53185 commit-author Fedor Pchelkin commit 061b0cb9327b80d7a0f63a33e7c3e2a91a71f142 A bad USB device is able to construct a service connection response message with target endpoint being ENDPOINT0 which is reserved for HTC_CTRL_RSVD_SVC and should not be modified to be used for any other services. Reject such service connection responses. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: fb9987d0f748 ("ath9k_htc: Support for AR9271 chipset.") Reported-by: syzbot+b68fbebe56d8362907e8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230516150427.79469-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru (cherry picked from commit 061b0cb9327b80d7a0f63a33e7c3e2a91a71f142) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c index 994ec48b2f669..86eed145b7666 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c @@ -114,7 +114,13 @@ static void htc_process_conn_rsp(struct htc_target *target, if (svc_rspmsg->status == HTC_SERVICE_SUCCESS) { epid = svc_rspmsg->endpoint_id; - if (epid < 0 || epid >= ENDPOINT_MAX) + + /* Check that the received epid for the endpoint to attach + * a new service is valid. ENDPOINT0 can't be used here as it + * is already reserved for HTC_CTRL_RSVD_SVC service and thus + * should not be modified. + */ + if (epid <= ENDPOINT0 || epid >= ENDPOINT_MAX) return; service_id = be16_to_cpu(svc_rspmsg->service_id); From 844155cc604dd022b2f2073851df81b0af6ea471 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Maple Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:33:13 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 3/9] wifi: brcmfmac: slab-out-of-bounds read in brcmf_get_assoc_ies() jira VULN-154480 cve CVE-2023-53213 commit-author Jisoo Jang commit 0da40e018fd034d87c9460123fa7f897b69fdee7 Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read that occurs in kmemdup() called from brcmf_get_assoc_ies(). The bug could occur when assoc_info->req_len, data from a URB provided by a USB device, is bigger than the size of buffer which is defined as WL_EXTRA_BUF_MAX. Add the size check for req_len/resp_len of assoc_info. Found by a modified version of syzkaller. [ 46.592467][ T7] ================================================================== [ 46.594687][ T7] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup+0x3e/0x50 [ 46.596572][ T7] Read of size 3014656 at addr ffff888019442000 by task kworker/0:1/7 [ 46.598575][ T7] [ 46.599157][ T7] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G O 5.14.0+ #145 [ 46.601333][ T7] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 46.604360][ T7] Workqueue: events brcmf_fweh_event_worker [ 46.605943][ T7] Call Trace: [ 46.606584][ T7] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd1 [ 46.607446][ T7] print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x93/0x334 [ 46.608610][ T7] ? kmemdup+0x3e/0x50 [ 46.609341][ T7] kasan_report.cold+0x79/0xd5 [ 46.610151][ T7] ? kmemdup+0x3e/0x50 [ 46.610796][ T7] kasan_check_range+0x14e/0x1b0 [ 46.611691][ T7] memcpy+0x20/0x60 [ 46.612323][ T7] kmemdup+0x3e/0x50 [ 46.612987][ T7] brcmf_get_assoc_ies+0x967/0xf60 [ 46.613904][ T7] ? brcmf_notify_vif_event+0x3d0/0x3d0 [ 46.614831][ T7] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [ 46.615683][ T7] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xfc/0x2770 [ 46.616552][ T7] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [ 46.617409][ T7] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xfc/0x2770 [ 46.618244][ T7] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [ 46.619024][ T7] brcmf_bss_connect_done.constprop.0+0x241/0x2e0 [ 46.620019][ T7] ? brcmf_parse_configure_security.isra.0+0x2a0/0x2a0 [ 46.620818][ T7] ? __lock_acquire+0x181f/0x5790 [ 46.621462][ T7] brcmf_notify_connect_status+0x448/0x1950 [ 46.622134][ T7] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 [ 46.622736][ T7] ? brcmf_cfg80211_join_ibss+0x7b0/0x7b0 [ 46.623390][ T7] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 [ 46.623962][ T7] ? brcmf_fweh_event_worker+0x19f/0xc60 [ 46.624603][ T7] ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0 [ 46.625145][ T7] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3e0/0x3e0 [ 46.625871][ T7] ? brcmf_cfg80211_join_ibss+0x7b0/0x7b0 [ 46.626545][ T7] brcmf_fweh_call_event_handler.isra.0+0x90/0x100 [ 46.627338][ T7] brcmf_fweh_event_worker+0x557/0xc60 [ 46.627962][ T7] ? brcmf_fweh_call_event_handler.isra.0+0x100/0x100 [ 46.628736][ T7] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 [ 46.629396][ T7] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 [ 46.629970][ T7] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 [ 46.630649][ T7] process_one_work+0x92b/0x1460 [ 46.631205][ T7] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x330/0x330 [ 46.631821][ T7] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [ 46.632347][ T7] worker_thread+0x95/0xe00 [ 46.632832][ T7] ? __kthread_parkme+0x115/0x1e0 [ 46.633393][ T7] ? process_one_work+0x1460/0x1460 [ 46.633957][ T7] kthread+0x3a1/0x480 [ 46.634369][ T7] ? set_kthread_struct+0x120/0x120 [ 46.634933][ T7] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 46.635431][ T7] [ 46.635687][ T7] Allocated by task 7: [ 46.636151][ T7] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 46.636628][ T7] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 [ 46.637108][ T7] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x19e/0x330 [ 46.637696][ T7] brcmf_cfg80211_attach+0x4a0/0x4040 [ 46.638275][ T7] brcmf_attach+0x389/0xd40 [ 46.638739][ T7] brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690 [ 46.639279][ T7] usb_probe_interface+0x2aa/0x760 [ 46.639820][ T7] really_probe+0x205/0xb70 [ 46.640342][ T7] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0 [ 46.640876][ T7] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150 [ 46.641445][ T7] __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0 [ 46.642000][ T7] bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0 [ 46.642543][ T7] __device_attach+0x23f/0x3a0 [ 46.643065][ T7] bus_probe_device+0x1da/0x290 [ 46.643644][ T7] device_add+0xb7b/0x1eb0 [ 46.644130][ T7] usb_set_configuration+0xf59/0x16f0 [ 46.644720][ T7] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x82/0xa0 [ 46.645295][ T7] usb_probe_device+0xbb/0x250 [ 46.645786][ T7] really_probe+0x205/0xb70 [ 46.646258][ T7] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0 [ 46.646804][ T7] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150 [ 46.647387][ T7] __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0 [ 46.647926][ T7] bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0 [ 46.648454][ T7] __device_attach+0x23f/0x3a0 [ 46.648939][ T7] bus_probe_device+0x1da/0x290 [ 46.649478][ T7] device_add+0xb7b/0x1eb0 [ 46.649936][ T7] usb_new_device.cold+0x49c/0x1029 [ 46.650526][ T7] hub_event+0x1c98/0x3950 [ 46.650975][ T7] process_one_work+0x92b/0x1460 [ 46.651535][ T7] worker_thread+0x95/0xe00 [ 46.651991][ T7] kthread+0x3a1/0x480 [ 46.652413][ T7] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 46.652885][ T7] [ 46.653131][ T7] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888019442000 [ 46.653131][ T7] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 [ 46.654669][ T7] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of [ 46.654669][ T7] 2048-byte region [ffff888019442000, ffff888019442800) [ 46.656137][ T7] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 46.656720][ T7] page:ffffea0000651000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x19440 [ 46.657792][ T7] head:ffffea0000651000 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 46.658673][ T7] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1) [ 46.659422][ T7] raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888100042000 [ 46.660363][ T7] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 46.661236][ T7] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 46.661956][ T7] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [ 46.662588][ T7] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52a20(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP), pid 7, ts 31136961085, free_ts 0 [ 46.664271][ T7] prep_new_page+0x1aa/0x240 [ 46.664763][ T7] get_page_from_freelist+0x159a/0x27c0 [ 46.665340][ T7] __alloc_pages+0x2da/0x6a0 [ 46.665847][ T7] alloc_pages+0xec/0x1e0 [ 46.666308][ T7] allocate_slab+0x380/0x4e0 [ 46.666770][ T7] ___slab_alloc+0x5bc/0x940 [ 46.667264][ T7] __slab_alloc+0x6d/0x80 [ 46.667712][ T7] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x30a/0x330 [ 46.668299][ T7] brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x50/0x470 [ 46.668885][ T7] brcmf_usb_probe+0xc97/0x1690 [ 46.669438][ T7] usb_probe_interface+0x2aa/0x760 [ 46.669988][ T7] really_probe+0x205/0xb70 [ 46.670487][ T7] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0 [ 46.671031][ T7] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150 [ 46.671604][ T7] __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0 [ 46.672192][ T7] bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0 [ 46.672739][ T7] page_owner free stack trace missing [ 46.673335][ T7] [ 46.673620][ T7] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 46.674213][ T7] ffff888019442700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 46.675083][ T7] ffff888019442780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 46.675994][ T7] >ffff888019442800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 46.676875][ T7] ^ [ 46.677323][ T7] ffff888019442880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 46.678190][ T7] ffff888019442900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 46.679052][ T7] ================================================================== [ 46.679945][ T7] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 46.680725][ T7] Kernel panic - not syncing: Reviewed-by: Arend van Spriel Signed-off-by: Jisoo Jang Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230309104457.22628-1-jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr (cherry picked from commit 0da40e018fd034d87c9460123fa7f897b69fdee7) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple --- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c index 360b103fe8980..202690bbba6d3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c @@ -5909,6 +5909,11 @@ static s32 brcmf_get_assoc_ies(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg, (struct brcmf_cfg80211_assoc_ielen_le *)cfg->extra_buf; req_len = le32_to_cpu(assoc_info->req_len); resp_len = le32_to_cpu(assoc_info->resp_len); + if (req_len > WL_EXTRA_BUF_MAX || resp_len > WL_EXTRA_BUF_MAX) { + bphy_err(drvr, "invalid lengths in assoc info: req %u resp %u\n", + req_len, resp_len); + return -EINVAL; + } if (req_len) { err = brcmf_fil_iovar_data_get(ifp, "assoc_req_ies", cfg->extra_buf, From 1bdad4061a0a0cc957b78579272f32d8f9ed39de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Maple Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:33:18 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 4/9] wifi: mac80211: check S1G action frame size jira VULN-154634 cve CVE-2023-53257 commit-author Johannes Berg commit 19e4a47ee74718a22e963e8a647c8c3bfe8bb05c Before checking the action code, check that it even exists in the frame. Reported-by: syzbot+be9c824e6f269d608288@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg (cherry picked from commit 19e4a47ee74718a22e963e8a647c8c3bfe8bb05c) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 4b5cd966db847..ae08d0cacfd52 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -3555,6 +3555,10 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_action(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) break; goto queue; case WLAN_CATEGORY_S1G: + if (len < offsetofend(typeof(*mgmt), + u.action.u.s1g.action_code)) + break; + switch (mgmt->u.action.u.s1g.action_code) { case WLAN_S1G_TWT_SETUP: case WLAN_S1G_TWT_TEARDOWN: From 9bce3c0f02fd4c5f97aeea391250f3ff8bdf8e7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Maple Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:33:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 5/9] ip6mr: Fix skb_under_panic in ip6mr_cache_report() jira VULN-155440 cve CVE-2023-53365 commit-author Yue Haibing commit 30e0191b16e8a58e4620fa3e2839ddc7b9d4281c skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff88771f69 len:56 put:-4 head:ffff88805f86a800 data:ffff887f5f86a850 tail:0x88 end:0x2c0 dev:pim6reg ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:192! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 2 PID: 22968 Comm: kworker/2:11 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3-00044-g0a8db05b571a #236 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x152/0x1d0 Call Trace: skb_push+0xc4/0xe0 ip6mr_cache_report+0xd69/0x19b0 reg_vif_xmit+0x406/0x690 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17e/0x6e0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d6a/0x3d20 vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3ab/0x5c0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17e/0x6e0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d6a/0x3d20 neigh_connected_output+0x3ed/0x570 ip6_finish_output2+0x5b5/0x1950 ip6_finish_output+0x693/0x11c0 ip6_output+0x24b/0x880 NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0xfd/0x530 ndisc_send_skb+0x9db/0x1400 ndisc_send_rs+0x12a/0x6c0 addrconf_dad_completed+0x3c9/0xea0 addrconf_dad_work+0x849/0x1420 process_one_work+0xa22/0x16e0 worker_thread+0x679/0x10c0 ret_from_fork+0x28/0x60 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 When setup a vlan device on dev pim6reg, DAD ns packet may sent on reg_vif_xmit(). reg_vif_xmit() ip6mr_cache_report() skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(pkt));//skb_network_offset(pkt) is 4 And skb_push declared as: void *skb_push(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len); skb->data -= len; //0xffff88805f86a84c - 0xfffffffc = 0xffff887f5f86a850 skb->data is set to 0xffff887f5f86a850, which is invalid mem addr, lead to skb_push() fails. Fixes: 14fb64e1f449 ("[IPV6] MROUTE: Support PIM-SM (SSM).") Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller (cherry picked from commit 30e0191b16e8a58e4620fa3e2839ddc7b9d4281c) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index 90fc41700ffa2..d0d19de6bd2d3 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ static int ip6mr_cache_report(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *pkt, And all this only to mangle msg->im6_msgtype and to set msg->im6_mbz to "mbz" :-) */ - skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(pkt)); + __skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(pkt)); skb_push(skb, sizeof(*msg)); skb_reset_transport_header(skb); From 16a59161044d94b658a95190ab9157f4eefcb4ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Maple Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:33:31 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 6/9] crypto: seqiv - Handle EBUSY correctly jira VULN-155735 cve CVE-2023-53373 commit-author Herbert Xu commit 32e62025e5e52fbe4812ef044759de7010b15dbc As it is seqiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS, which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the request. However, as the caller of seqiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged requests will trigger a use-after-free. Fixes: 0a270321dbf9 ("[CRYPTO] seqiv: Add Sequence Number IV Generator") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu (cherry picked from commit 32e62025e5e52fbe4812ef044759de7010b15dbc) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple --- crypto/seqiv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/seqiv.c b/crypto/seqiv.c index 47cb0416d8495..9a128b733ea9c 100644 --- a/crypto/seqiv.c +++ b/crypto/seqiv.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete2(struct aead_request *req, int err) struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req); struct crypto_aead *geniv; - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) + if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY) return; if (err) From ad46b621e928330785fc39090488d9e2e9d72e41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Maple Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:33:34 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 7/9] Bluetooth: Fix potential use-after-free when clear keys jira VULN-155797 cve CVE-2023-53386 commit-author Min Li commit 3673952cf0c6cf81b06c66a0b788abeeb02ff3ae Similar to commit c5d2b6fa26b5 ("Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free in hci_remove_ltk/hci_remove_irk"). We can not access k after kfree_rcu() call. Fixes: d7d41682efc2 ("Bluetooth: Fix Suspicious RCU usage warnings") Signed-off-by: Min Li Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz (cherry picked from commit 3673952cf0c6cf81b06c66a0b788abeeb02ff3ae) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple --- net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c index ddcc7876150fa..94c3adacfda74 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c @@ -2346,9 +2346,9 @@ void hci_uuids_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) void hci_link_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct link_key *key; + struct link_key *key, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry(key, &hdev->link_keys, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &hdev->link_keys, list) { list_del_rcu(&key->list); kfree_rcu(key, rcu); } @@ -2356,9 +2356,9 @@ void hci_link_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) void hci_smp_ltks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct smp_ltk *k; + struct smp_ltk *k, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(k, tmp, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) { list_del_rcu(&k->list); kfree_rcu(k, rcu); } @@ -2366,9 +2366,9 @@ void hci_smp_ltks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) void hci_smp_irks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct smp_irk *k; + struct smp_irk *k, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry(k, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(k, tmp, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) { list_del_rcu(&k->list); kfree_rcu(k, rcu); } @@ -2376,9 +2376,9 @@ void hci_smp_irks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) void hci_blocked_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct blocked_key *b; + struct blocked_key *b, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry(b, &hdev->blocked_keys, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(b, tmp, &hdev->blocked_keys, list) { list_del_rcu(&b->list); kfree_rcu(b, rcu); } From 3a919cc594622320051ccd547fe788aef7a064af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Maple Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:33:41 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 8/9] tunnels: fix out of bounds access when building IPv6 PMTU error jira VULN-8934 cve CVE-2024-26665 commit-author Antoine Tenart commit d75abeec401f8c86b470e7028a13fcdc87e5dd06 If the ICMPv6 error is built from a non-linear skb we get the following splat, BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_csum+0x220/0x240 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811d402c80 by task netperf/820 CPU: 0 PID: 820 Comm: netperf Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #543 ... kasan_report+0xd8/0x110 do_csum+0x220/0x240 csum_partial+0xc/0x20 skb_tunnel_check_pmtu+0xeb9/0x3280 vxlan_xmit_one+0x14c2/0x4080 vxlan_xmit+0xf61/0x5c00 dev_hard_start_xmit+0xfb/0x510 __dev_queue_xmit+0x7cd/0x32a0 br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x39d/0x6a0 Use skb_checksum instead of csum_partial who cannot deal with non-linear SKBs. Fixes: 4cb47a8644cc ("tunnels: PMTU discovery support for directly bridged IP packets") Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller (cherry picked from commit d75abeec401f8c86b470e7028a13fcdc87e5dd06) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple --- net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c index 1d4e7a021b4aa..5e8e71c087256 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static int iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6(struct sk_buff *skb, int mtu) }; skb_reset_network_header(skb); - csum = csum_partial(icmp6h, len, 0); + csum = skb_checksum(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb), len, 0); icmp6h->icmp6_cksum = csum_ipv6_magic(&nip6h->saddr, &nip6h->daddr, len, IPPROTO_ICMPV6, csum); From 108729bec7c9e134972f17cd5f3f53cb970cec61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Maple Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:33:45 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 9/9] ext4: fix double-free of blocks due to wrong extents moved_len jira VULN-42473 cve CVE-2024-26704 commit-author Baokun Li commit 55583e899a5357308274601364741a83e78d6ac4 In ext4_move_extents(), moved_len is only updated when all moves are successfully executed, and only discards orig_inode and donor_inode preallocations when moved_len is not zero. When the loop fails to exit after successfully moving some extents, moved_len is not updated and remains at 0, so it does not discard the preallocations. If the moved extents overlap with the preallocated extents, the overlapped extents are freed twice in ext4_mb_release_inode_pa() and ext4_process_freed_data() (as described in commit 94d7c16cbbbd ("ext4: Fix double-free of blocks with EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT")), and bb_free is incremented twice. Hence when trim is executed, a zero-division bug is triggered in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() because bb_free is not zero and bb_fragments is zero. Therefore, update move_len after each extent move to avoid the issue. Reported-by: Wei Chen Reported-by: xingwei lee Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAO4mrferzqBUnCag8R3m2zf897ts9UEuhjFQGPtODT92rYyR2Q@mail.gmail.com Fixes: fcf6b1b729bc ("ext4: refactor ext4_move_extents code base") CC: # 3.18 Signed-off-by: Baokun Li Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104142040.2835097-2-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o (cherry picked from commit 55583e899a5357308274601364741a83e78d6ac4) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple --- fs/ext4/move_extent.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/move_extent.c b/fs/ext4/move_extent.c index b8e2d3ffee0a8..579d029de92d0 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/move_extent.c +++ b/fs/ext4/move_extent.c @@ -615,6 +615,7 @@ ext4_move_extents(struct file *o_filp, struct file *d_filp, __u64 orig_blk, goto out; o_end = o_start + len; + *moved_len = 0; while (o_start < o_end) { struct ext4_extent *ex; ext4_lblk_t cur_blk, next_blk; @@ -670,7 +671,7 @@ ext4_move_extents(struct file *o_filp, struct file *d_filp, __u64 orig_blk, */ ext4_double_up_write_data_sem(orig_inode, donor_inode); /* Swap original branches with new branches */ - move_extent_per_page(o_filp, donor_inode, + *moved_len += move_extent_per_page(o_filp, donor_inode, orig_page_index, donor_page_index, offset_in_page, cur_len, unwritten, &ret); @@ -680,9 +681,6 @@ ext4_move_extents(struct file *o_filp, struct file *d_filp, __u64 orig_blk, o_start += cur_len; d_start += cur_len; } - *moved_len = o_start - orig_blk; - if (*moved_len > len) - *moved_len = len; out: if (*moved_len) {